

Why the VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail) Cannot be the Official Ballot!

✘ THE VVPAT IS NOT ACCESSIBLE

"...none of the systems meet accessibility requirements of current law and none perform satisfactorily in test voting by persons with a range of disabilities and alternate language needs."

-2007 California "Top to Bottom" Accessibility Review of DREs

✘ THE VVPAT IS NOT SECURE

"A voting system is software-dependent if the correction of the election results is dependent on the correction of the software...The lack of independent capability in DRE voting systems is one of the main reasons behind continued questions about voting system security...the DRE in practical terms cannot be made secure."

-National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Nov. 2006

"I now believe that a DRE with a VVPAT is not a reasonable voting system. The only system that...achieves software independence as defined by NIST ...is paper ballots with ballot marking machines for accessibility and a precinct optical scan for counting—accompanied with random audits."

-Avi Rubin, leading computer security expert, 2007.

"An individual with even brief access to polling station hardware can tamper with installed firmware in a way that causes votes and paper trails to be recorded incorrectly, security logs to be corrupted, or ballots to be presented to voters incorrectly."

-CA "Top to Bottom" Review, Executive Summary, Report on the Sequoia source code, page i. 2007.

✘ THE VVPAT IS NOT ACCURATE

The Election Science Institute's study of the Cuyahoga County, Ohio 2006 primary election found that "The machines' four sources of vote totals-- VVPAT individual ballots, VVPAT summary, election archive, and memory cards—did not agree with one another."

During a Sequoia demonstration, the machine failed to report 4 votes in Spanish. The company's Vice-President said the "touch screen did record the election votes in its memory, but through an oversight [in the ballot set-up] failed to reflect the votes in its electronic display and printout."

- Sacramento CA, August 2004

✘ THE VVPAT FREQUENTLY FAILS AND IS DIFFICULT TO AUDIT

In tests designed to approximate an actual election, there were ten paper jams requiring the machines to be re-booted for every 10,000 votes. The California Secretary of State reported, "Many of the printer jams caused a loss of VVPAT records."

-California Volume Tests, Oct. 11, 2005

"... it was seen throughout the manual count that a small number of the VVPAT ballots were damaged in the printing process. Printers jammed, ink ran low, and other issues with the printers manifested themselves...The formatting of the VVPAT printouts did not support a robust recount of the VVPATs."

-Cuyahoga Co. OH, Election Science Institute Report, 2006)

✘ THE VVPAT IS NOT DURABLE

New York State law requires that Ballots must be kept secure for at least 22 months. Print on the thermal paper used for VVPATs fades in normal conditions within one year.

✘ THE VVPAT IS NOT CONFIRMED BY MANY VOTERS

Research shows "that over 60% of voters do not notice if their votes as shown on the review screen are different than how they were selected." How much more likely are they to miss problems when reviewing a small print-out covered by glass?

- <http://chil.rice.edu/alumni/petersos/EverettDissertation.pdf>

✘ THE VVPAT IS DISLIKED BY ELECTION OFFICIALS

Electionline.org reports that election officials have urged opposition to paper records because counting them in manual audits and recounts would be "onerous and time consuming." They emphasize how long it would take to count voter verified paper audit trails. - *Election Reform, 2000-2006*